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Emotion regulation strategies provide a means by which to modulate
our social behavior. In this study, we investigated the effect of using
reappraisal to both up- and downregulate social decision making.
After being instructed on how to use reappraisal, participants played
the Ultimatum Game while undergoing functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging and applied the strategies of upregulation (reapprais-
ing the proposer’s intentions as more negative), down-regulation
(reappraising the proposer’s intentions as less negative), as well as
a baseline ‘‘look’’ condition. As hypothesized, when reappraising,
decision acceptance rates were altered, with a greater number of
unfair offers accepted while down-regulating and a greater number
of unfair offers rejected while upregulating, both relative to the
baseline condition. At the neural level, during reappraisal, significant
activations were observed in the inferior and middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), in addition to the medial prefrontal cortex and cingulate gyrus
for unfair offers only. Regulated decisions involved left inferior frontal
gyrus for upregulation and MFG for down-regulation strategies,
respectively. Importantly, the effects of emotion modulation were
evident in posterior insula, with less activation for down-regulation
and more activation for upregulation in these areas. Notably, we
show for the first time that top-down strategies such as reappraisal
strongly affect our socioeconomic decisions.
Keywords: decision making, emotion regulation, mentalizing, reappraisal,
Ultimatum Game
Introduction
Standard economic theory predicts that people will behave in
a largely self-interested fashion when interacting with others.
However, a considerable amount of recent experimental work
has demonstrated that players are often inﬂuenced by factors
beyond their narrow ﬁnancial self-interest. A case in point is
behavior in the Ultimatum Game (UG, Guth et al. 1982). Here, 2
players have the opportunity to split a sum of money. One
player, the proposer, makes an offer as to how this money
should be split. The responder must then make a decision to
either accept or reject this offer. If the offer is accepted then
the money is split as proposed, but if the responder rejects the
offer then neither player receives anything. Of particular
interest is the well-replicated result that low offers are rejected
approximately 50% of the time (Camerer 2003). That is,
players’ choices in the UG are not purely driven by ﬁnancial
self-interest but rather are guided by a subjective interpretation
of the social interaction, with evidence that negative emotions
play an important role in punishment behavior (Pillutla and
Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005). Neuroimaging work
has demonstrated that the anterior insula, an area often
implicated in somatosensory representation, is more active
for unfair offers, with this activity tracking the decision to
accept or reject (Sanfey et al. 2003). Furthermore, several
groups have recently shown that manipulating the emotional
state of participants can signiﬁcantly alter UG decision making
(Harle´ and Sanfey 2007; Moretti and di Pellegrino 2010). These
results demonstrate that even subtle incidental negative
emotions can play an important role in biasing decision
making, likely due to their power to change the way
participants mentalize about the social interaction (Frith et al.
1991; Wagner et al. 2011). Indeed, the role of emotion has been
incorporated in recent dual-process models of decision making
(van’t Wout et al. 2010; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Sanfey 2007),
though exactly how cognitive and emotional systems interact is
still unclear. It seems evident that the social context and, in
particular, negative emotions play a role in decision making in
general, and in interactive tasks like the UG speciﬁcally,
however, it is still largely unknown how these processes
interact with deliberative systems and if they can be controlled
in a ‘‘top-down’’ fashion.
A useful approach to investigate this question is to examine
if players in these social interactive scenarios have the ability to
alter their decisions by exerting effort to modulate the elicited
negative emotions. Although there is relatively little work on
the link between top-down control of emotions and decision
making, the experimental use of emotion regulation strategies
has the potential to greatly elucidate this relationship.
Emotion regulation refers to a set of different strategies
by which ‘‘individuals inﬂuence which emotions they have,
when they have them, and how they experience and express
these emotions’’ (cf. Gross 1999). The relevance of emotion
regulation to interactive decision making is suggested by
recent neuropsychological studies demonstrating that lesions
in brain areas implicated in negative emotional regulation result
in increased rejections of unfair offers (Koenigs and Tranel
2007; Moretti et al. 2009). Additionally, in individual decision-
making tasks, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) showed that ‘‘thinking
like a trader’’ resulted in changes in preferences when
participants were trained to use a strategy to reframe their
role in an economic transaction. Another study (Staudinger
et al. 2009) asked participants to reappraise (in the form of
‘‘distancing,’’ i.e., to detach oneself from feelings and behave as
a neutral observer) economic stimuli such as gains or losses in
a monetary reward task, ﬁnding an attenuation of expected
value and a modulation of outcome valence in the striatum. In
the same fashion, Martin and Delgado (2011) showed
a modulation of the striatum and a reduction of risky choice
behavior in a gambling task when participants regulated their
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emotions following a simple instruction (‘‘try to think of
a calming scene’’).
Previous studies on emotion regulation using simple emo-
tional pictures (International Affective Picture System, IAPS,
Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert 2008) have shown an increase in
activation of the prefrontal cortex (dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, DLPFC) when applying a regulation strategy (Ochsner
et al. 2002; Staudinger et al. 2009). One possibility is that there is
a speciﬁc region commonly activated across tasks, independent
from the particular emotion-inducing stimuli used. The ﬁrst
question we will address with the present study is whether the
area of prefrontal cortex shown to be responsible for regulating
emotions stemming from simple emotional pictures is also active
for emotions derived from social interactive decision making.
This question is important, as it will potentially further elucidate
the role of DLPFC and its ability to modulate responses to a wide
variety of stimuli and situations. To address this, we will look at
the main effect of strategy, that is, the brain differences between
employing a regulation strategy and not employing one. A
related question is whether the effect of strategy is independent
from the type of offer made and the subsequent decision. To
answer this, separate contrasts will be computed for the effect of
strategy for each trial type (fair and unfair offers, respectively). If
a region is involved in emotion regulation strategies, we may also
ﬁnd some connection with behavioral measures. Additionally, we
will also examine the relationship between brain measures in
the UG and other behavioral measures to assess the likely use of
these strategies in everyday life (by using scales such as the
Emotional Regulation Questionnaire [ERQ]; Gross and John
2003, for example). To address this, we will examine brain signal
change in key regions of interests and how this in turn correlates
with behavioral measures.
Despite their importance, the previous studies outlined
above focused their attention primarily on individual decision
making, examining factors such as loss aversion, reward, and
expected value. Therefore, it is still unknown whether (and,
perhaps more importantly, how) negative emotions stemming
from social interactive decision making may be subject to
regulation and lead to subsequent changes in decision
behavior. In a recent behavioral study, our group demonstrated
that participants in an emotional reappraisal condition (down-
regulation) accepted unfair UG offers at a greater rate than
those in a no-regulation condition (van’t Wout et al. 2010),
providing a useful ﬁrst indication of how emotions are
regulated during interactive decision making. Despite this
encouraging result, some issues still remain. For example, this
study (and others) demonstrated that decisions can be affected
by down-regulating emotions, but no test of upregulation was
conducted. This is important, as reappraisal is used not merely
to subjectively improve bad situations, but can also be used to
make bad situations feel worse. In some cases, cognitively
upregulating negative emotion may be desirable (Ochsner et al.
2004), as when players reconsider an unequal offer to be even
more unfair. In line with previous work on this topic (Ochsner
et al. 2004), we deﬁne upregulation as the interpretation of
intentions, behavior, and their outcomes as more negative
(things are getting worse) and down-regulation as the in-
terpretation of intentions, actions, and their outcomes as less
negative (things are getting better). To date, the effect of
upregulation on decision making has not been examined.
Modulating our emotions, and in turn modulating our sub-
sequent decisions, may play a vital role when cooperating and
reciprocating with other individuals in daily interactions, and
therefore, a more complete account of how this process
operates would be useful. Here, we aimed to extend the
behavioral results from van’t Wout et al. (2010), by exploring
both up- and downregulation effects within participants. This
allows us to explore whether the negative emotions induced by
an unfair Ultimatum offer can be both reduced and increased
depending on the manipulation and whether this is then
reﬂected in the decision to punish the other player for the
unfairness. We hypothesized that we would observe lower
rejection rates of unfair offers when asked to downregulate, as
we have found previously, but additionally see higher rejection
rates when asked to upregulate, both conditions as compared
with baseline.
We will explore this by looking separately for the effects of
regulated down and up decisions. These contrasts will look at
speciﬁc regions responsible for each of the 2 reappraisal
strategies when rejecting more (as a consequence of upregu-
lation) or rejecting less (downregulation) of the offers. One
possibility is that the processes underlying the decrease or
increase of emotions are coded in 2 or more different brain
structures.
This behavioral result would further conﬁrm and extend
the interaction between affective and deliberative systems in
decision making, as suggested by dual-system accounts
(Sanfey and Chang 2008). These models distinguish between
a System 1, described as automatic, fast, unconscious,
emotional, and slow learning, and a System 2, described as
controlled, slow, conscious, affectively neutral, and fast
learning. Here, we aim to further explore the way in which
cognitive strategies interact and subsequently alter decision
making in a socioeconomic context. Moreover, this approach
may help to better understand the speciﬁc emotions
involved when regulating. We hypothesize that, in line with
previous work (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996), anger may be
the target emotion involved in UG and the one modulated by
the reappraisal strategy.
A ﬁnal important question, we address is whether emotion
regulation applied to social decision making shares the same
brain areas as involved in regulating either simple visual stimuli
(IAPS, Ochsner et al. 2002, 2004), or in individual decision
making (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009; Staudinger et al. 2009;
Jarcho et al. 2011; Martin and Delgado 2011). Studies
investigating the neural basis of emotion regulation have
demonstrated that the reappraisal of emotions is associated
with the modulation of key regions processing speciﬁc
emotions, such as the amygdala, striatum, or orbitofrontal
cortex. Sanfey et al. (2003) proposed the involvement of
anterior insula and DLPFC in response to unfair offers in the
UG, such that greater activation of the anterior insula, a brain
area associated with the processing of aversive emotions such
as anger and disgust (Phillips et al. 1997), was associated with
the rejection of unfair offers. Thus, one potential hypothesis is
that up- and downregulation in social interactive decision
making (UG) could recruit the insula (effects of modulation).
This would be a conﬁrmation of the role of insula in emotional
reactivity when receiving unfair offers. If the insula demon-
strates modulated activity, this could be considered strong
support for its role in emotional reactions in the UG. To test
this hypothesis, we will look at regions modulated by the
respective strategies (i.e., showing a linear increase in activity:
Down < Look < Up).
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In summary, the present study can yield interesting and
important new insights into both whether and how emotion
regulation strategies can inﬂuence behavior in a well-charac-
terized social interactive decision-making task.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-one participants (11 males, mean age: 23.5 ± 3.6 years)
participated in the study. Participants had normal or corrected to
normal vision and had no history of psychiatric, medical, or
neurological illness, as veriﬁed by a semistructured interview by
a physician. All participants provided written informed consent, as
approved by the local ethical committee, and were paid 35 euros for
participation.
Behavioral Paradigm
The paradigm comprised a general cognitive and emotional assessment
(described below), followed by training and testing in emotion
regulation techniques. Then, they underwent scanning with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while playing rounds of the UG
under conditions of emotion regulation. Finally, there was a debrieﬁng
phase.
Assessment
In the assessment phase, participants ﬁlled out a series of self-
administered questionnaires. These comprised the Positive and
Negative Affective scales (Watson et al. 1988); the behavioral inhibition
and the behavioral activation scales (Carver and White 1994); the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1980); and, of primary interest for
the present study, the ERQ (Gross and John 2003).
Training and Testing
In the training phase, participants were speciﬁcally trained in
reappraisal strategies by the experimenter. To begin, participants were
introduced to the term reappraisal as a way whereby people in daily life
may reinterpret an event by changing its meaning. They were told that
interpreting an event as more negative can make that event even more
negative in their eyes, while interpreting it as less negative can
decrease its negativity accordingly. In line with previous research on
this topic (Ochsner et al. 2004), we deﬁne upregulation (‘‘increase’’
strategy) as ‘‘the interpretation of the situation, event, or people’s
intentions and behaviors as more negative’’ and downregulation (‘‘de-
crease’’ strategy) as ‘‘the interpretation of the situation, event, or people’s
intentions and behaviors as less negative,’’ and the ‘‘look’’ condition as
one where the participant should perceive the situation spontaneously
without any effort to reinterpret. Participants were given an example of
a common negative situation and how it can be reinterpreted
(reappraised) in such a way as to make it either more or less negative.
Thus, in the case of a crying woman (as shown in Fig. 1A), the ‘‘increase’’
strategy might involve imagining that the woman is in great pain because
she is mourning a loved one’s death. In contrast, the ‘‘decrease’’ condition
might involve imagining that the woman is merely tired or suffering from
a headache. For the ‘‘look’’ condition, they were to simply allow
themselves to respond naturally without any effort of interpretation.
Importantly, this reappraisal training was not focused on giving
instructions ‘‘what’’ to think for each situation but rather ‘‘how’’ to
rethink the stimulus by manipulating the main variables (intentions and
behaviors) in either a more or less negative way. To ensure participants
understood the instructions and were successfully applying the required
reappraisal strategies, they were asked to reappraise while viewing
pictures from the IAPS picture set (Lang et al. 2008). Eighteen unpleasant
IAPS pictures were selected and divided into 3 subsets to be used across
the reappraisal conditions (up, down, and look). The 3 subsets were
selected to have standardized ratings balanced across both valence (2.68,
2.55, and 2.60, respectively) and arousal (5.2, 5.36, and 5.37) (Lang et al.
2008), with these subsets not differing signiﬁcantly on valence (subset 1
vs. 2, P = 0.80; subset 1 vs. 3, P = 0.79; subset 2 vs. 3, P = 0.93) or on
arousal (subset 1 vs. 2, P = 0.88; subset 1 vs. 3, P = 0.83; subset 2 vs. 3, P =
0.98) using two-sample t-tests.
After a picture was presented for 5 s, participants rated it according
to valence and arousal dimensions using the Self Assessment Manikin
procedure (Lang 1994) (see Fig. 1A). After participants completed this
task, they were asked to give an example of their interpretation for 2
IAPS pictures. If the experimenter was satisﬁed by the reappraisal
strategies used (using the criteria of interpreting the stimuli as more or
less negative), the participants were introduced to the last part of the
training, the UG.
Here, instructions were ﬁrst given as to the nature of the UG. The
task instructions emphasized that the different partners in the game
would play the game independently of each other, and participants
were led to believe the games would be played for real with the set of
partners they saw. After this information, participants were given
instructions as to how to apply reappraisal in the context of the UG. In
the UG-training phase, each participant played 3 practice rounds of the
UG, twice in which they were asked to reappraise (once for each of the
Figure 1. Experimental design, with Training phase (A) and Testing phase (B). In the training phase (outside the scanner) participants observed unpleasant IAPS pictures after
receiving the relevant reappraisal strategy for that trial (increase, decrease, and look). After that, they rated on a two-scale Self Assessment Manikin the perceived arousal and
valence. In the testing phase (inside the scanner) participants played the standard UG while applying the same reappraisal strategies.
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respective strategies) and once in which they played without any
reappraisal instruction (baseline condition). Based on van’t Wout et al.
(2010), the instructions given as to how to apply reappraisal strategies
were as follows: ‘‘It is very important that you now apply the reappraisal
strategies learned in the IAPS training to the situations evoked by the
UG. In particular, you should try to come up with possible
interpretations of the intentions and behaviors of the proposer in
a way to make it more negative (up condition) or less negative (down
condition). For example, when instructed to ‘‘increase,’’ you could, for
example, think that the other player is a selﬁsh person (intentions) and
wants to keep all the money (behavior). Whereas, when you have to
‘‘decrease,’’ you could, for example, think that the player has ﬁnancial
problems and is making the best offer he/she can.’’ In the ‘‘look’’
condition, participants were asked to read and respond to the offer
spontaneously. Participants were debriefed following these 3 practice
trials and asked to report their strategies for each trial. Once they had
mastered the technique to the satisfaction of the experimenter, they
were prepared for the scanning session. If they had not grasped these
techniques, they were provided with further training and explanation.
Notably, the focus of reappraisal was to be the ‘‘intentions and
behaviors’’ of the player and not the economic offer itself.
After the UG training, participants entered the scanner and played
a block of 20 trials for each of the 3 regulation conditions, counter-
balanced across participants, for a total of 60 trials as responders. Each
trial involved a division of 10 euros. Based on the results of a pilot study,
strategy was blocked in order to avoid task-switching costs across
strategies. The set of offers received by each participant was
preassigned. This set of 20 offers per strategy was comprised of 7 fair
offers (V5 to each player) and 13 unfair offers, deﬁned as offering the
participant less than half of the total amount. The unfair set was
composed of 7 very unfair offers of V1 and of 6 mid-range values (2
offers of V2, 2 offers of V3, and 2 offers of V4). Half of the offers were
made by a male partner and half by a female partner. The order of
partners and the pictures associated with each offer was randomized.
On each trial, participants ﬁrst saw a picture of the proposer on that
round, followed by the offer of that player. After the offer was made,
participants either accepted or rejected the offer. They then saw the
associated outcome, that is, the payment to each player for that trial
(see Fig. 1B for a timeline). To encourage participants to make real
decisions, it was emphasized that they would be paid according to their
choices in the game, in addition to a ﬁxed amount for participation
(though to comply with local ethical guidelines all were in fact paid the
same amount).
Debrieﬁng
In a postscan session, participants were shown 2 sample UG rounds
used during the scanning session (speciﬁcally, a fair 5:5 offer and an
unfair 1:9 offer) and were asked to evaluate the strength of emotions
elicited (separately for anger, sadness, disgust, surprise, and happiness)
on a 9-point Likert scale. After each example, they were also asked to
indicate whether they felt their emotions were modulated according to
the strategies used (up- and downregulation, respectively).
MRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were controlled using
E-prime software. Responses were made with the index and middle
ﬁngers of the right hand using 2 buttons on a 4-button MRI-compatible
response box. Behavioral responses (IAPS ratings, rejection rates, and
questionnaires) were analyzed using SPSS and STATISTICA. Whole brain
distortion-corrected Echo Planar Images (EPI) with 32 axial slices (3 mm
thick, 1 mm gap) were collected at 4T (Bruker MedSpec MRI), with a T2
*-
sensitive gradient echo spiral pulse sequence (time repetition of 2.2 s,
time echo 33 ms, 75 ﬂip angle, 64 3 64 data acquisition matrix). T2-
weighted spin-echo scans were acquired for anatomical localization
using the same slice prescription. Functional images were slice time
corrected and motion corrected using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London). For all participants, we acquired 738
volumes (246 for each fMRI run); the ﬁrst 3 volumes were discarded for
each run. In preprocessing of the data, the EPI volumes were spatially
realigned to correct for movement artifacts (Ashburner and Friston
2003a) and motion corrected by distortion interaction (Andersson et al.
2001), transformed to the Montreal Neurological Institute standard space
(Ashburner and Friston 2003b), and smoothed using 9-mm Gaussian
kernel to account for residual intersubject differences and to accom-
modate assumptions of random ﬁeld theory used for family-wise error
corrections (Worsley and Friston 1995). All subsequent analyses of the
functional images were performed using the general linear model
implemented in SPM8. For statistical analysis, we modeled the onset of
each category and convolved with the hemodynamic response function
(event duration = 0), then estimated the effect size for each participant
for each of the relevant 9 conditions (unfair rejected offer downregulate,
unfair rejected offer look, unfair rejected offer upregulate, unfair
accepted offer downregulate, unfair accepted offer look, unfair accepted
offer upregulate, fair accepted offer downregulate, fair accepted offer
look, and fair accepted offer upregulate) using the general linear model
(Kiebel and Holmes 2003). Because our main question concerned the
decisions taken in the UG, activation onsets were aligned with the
display of the proposed monetary division on each trial. Finally, the ﬁrst-
level analyses included also the parameters of the realignment (motion
correction) as covariates of no interest. Next, we obtained 9 parameter
estimates per participants, corresponding to the 9 conditions of interest.
Statistical threshold was set to P-corrected = 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons (family wise corrected [FWE]) at the cluster level (peak size
estimated at P-uncorrected = 0.001), using the whole brain as the volume
of interest. Furthermore, region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were also
carried out with the aim of providing additional information based on
main effects and simple contrasts from the random effects analysis. Each
ROI consisted of a sphere of 6 mm of diameter centered around the peak
of activation using Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al. 2002).
Results
Behavioral Results
Training Phase, Debrieﬁng, and Manipulation Check
We ﬁrst examined if the affective ratings while reappraising
IAPS pictures were different across conditions in the training
phase. An analysis of variance (ANOVA), with type of measure
(arousal vs. valence) and reappraisal strategies (down vs. look
vs. up), returned a signiﬁcant main effect of measure (F1,20 =
73.707, P < 0.001) as well as a signiﬁcant interaction (F2,40 =
26.978, P < 0.001), but not the effect of reappraisal strategies
(F2,40 = 0.098, P = 0.909). Next, we ran paired t-tests with
participants’ subjective ratings as dependent variables sepa-
rately for both arousal and valence. All comparisons were
signiﬁcant, indicating that participants appeared to have
learned reappraisal abilities—Valence: look versus down
(t1,20 = 6.30, P < 0.0001), look versus up (t1,20 = 2.52, P <
0.05), and down versus up (t1,20 = 5.9, P < 0.0001); Arousal: look
versus down (t1,20 = –3.32, P < 0.005), look versus up (t1,20 =
–2.22, P < 0.05); down versus up (t1,20 = –6.38 P < 0.0001).
When participants were required to downregulate, IAPS
pictures were judged as less arousing and less unpleasant as
compared with the look condition. When upregulating, the
pictures were rated as more arousing and unpleasant (Fig. 2A).
Importantly, to ensure that these ratings were comparable with
the standard IAPS ratings, we computed a two-sample t-test
between the ratings of the 6 pictures presented in the ‘‘look’’
baseline condition and the IAPS normative (United States)
ratings of the same 6 pictures (Lang et al. 2008), with the 2
groups (participants vs. normative controls) as the grouping
variable. We found no signiﬁcant difference for both arousal
(t1,10 = 1.249, P = 0.240) and valence (t1,10 = 1.714, P = 0.117).
Then, to understand which emotion might be involved when
reappraising the UG and to check for the success of our
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experimental manipulation, we analyzed the formal debrieﬁng
questionnaires that were completed after the experiment. This
debrieﬁng exposed subjects to the same kind of stimuli as was
displayed during the scanning session, but added questions to
understand the kind of emotion elicited, the level of emotional
strength, and the perceived ability to modulate them when
reappraising.
One participant was excluded due to noncompletion of the
ratings. Paired t-tests were performed using subjective ratings
with all pairs of emotions as dependent variables. Results
demonstrate that the level of anger signiﬁcantly differed from
all other emotions (anger--disgust: t1,19 = 2.058, P < 0.05; anger--
surprise t1,19 = 2.868, P < 0.01; anger--happiness: t1,19 = 6.064,
P < 0.001; anger--sadness: t1,19 = 2.96, P < 0.05); disgust differed
from happiness (t1,19 = 4.807, P < 0.001) but not from surprise
t1,19 = 1.539, P = 0.14) and from sadness (t1,19 = 0.847, P =
0.408); surprise differed from happiness (t1,19 = 4.578, P <
0.001) but not from sadness (t1,19 = –0.607, P = 0.55); happiness
differed from sadness (t1,19 = –4.188, P < 0.001). Overall, these
results indicate that the emotion elicited by the unfair offers in
postscan ratings was primarily anger, followed by other
negative emotions, such as sadness and disgust. This may
suggest that anger was the most likely emotion to be modulated
by the reappraisal strategies when subjects reappraised the UG
rounds in the scan session. Importantly, anger and disgust were
stronger for unfair compared with fair offers (anger for 1V–anger
for 5V: t1,19 = 6.530, P < 0.001; disgust for 1V-disgust for 5V:
t1,19 = 6.328, P < 0.001). Finally, in a manipulation check,
participants were asked to indicate whether they felt their
emotions changed according to the strategy adopted. Results
were computed as deviations from the mean (5 in a scale from
1 to 9) using paired t-tests with ratings for each of 2 offers as
dependent variables. Participant ratings indicate that in the
‘‘Down’’ condition, both fair (5:5) and unfair (1:9) offers were
modulated in the predicted direction (t1,20 = 2.416, P < 0.05 and
t1,20 = –3.141, P < 0.05, respectively), while in the ‘‘Up’’ condition
only the unfair offer was modulated in the expected direction
(t1,20 = 2.234, P < 0.05; t1,20 = 0.576, P > 0.05) for the fair offer.
Rejection Rates in the UG
To examine the effect of reappraisal on acceptance rates, we
conducted a 3 (emotion regulation strategies: down vs. look vs.
up) 3 5 (offers: V5, V4, V3, V2, V1) within-subject ANOVA.
Results showed a main effect of emotion regulation, F2,28 =
18.9, P < 0.0001, a main effect of offer, F4,56 = 105.3, P <
0.0001, and an interaction between emotion regulation and
offer, F8,112 = 17.2, P < 0.05, all Greenhouse--Geisser corrected.
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests demonstrated decreased
punishment behavior (rejection rates) for most offers after
downregulation, as compared with the look condition. In
particular V1: difference = –36.05%, P < 0.05; V2: d = –33.33%,
P < 0.05; V3: d = –30.95%, P < 0.05; V4: d = –11.9%, P > 0.05;
V5: d = –0.68%, P > 0.5; and increased rejection rates after
upregulation as compared with the look condition (V1: d =
3.4%, P > 0.05; V2: d = 19.04%, P > 0.05; V3: d = 16.66%, P >
0.105; V4: d = 26.19%, P < 0.05; V5: d = 4.76%, P > 0.05). When
comparing Up versus Down, all offers but one (V5) were
signiﬁcantly different (P < 0.05) (see Fig. 2B). Since, as
expected, there was no effect of manipulation on the fair
offers (V5), with almost all of these offers accepted, to
maximize blood oxygen level--dependent signal, we collapsed
across all the unfair offers (from V1 to V4) and compared these
to the fair (V5) set. Additional Bonferroni-corrected analysis on
these sets showed that for the fair offers, the strategies did not
signiﬁcantly affect the rejection rates (all P s > 0.05), whereas
they strongly affected the unfair offer decisions (P < 0.05) (see
Fig. 2C). Notably, there was a correlation between the change
in the valence ratings (but not arousal) when reappraising the
IAPS pictures, and the change in the rejection rates when
reappraising the UG (q = 0.493, P < 0.05; q = 0.14, P = 0.95,
respectively), both calculated as the difference between Up
Figure 2. Behavioral data. In the Training phase (A), participants’ perceived valence
and arousal was significantly modulated by the reappraisal strategies adopted.
A linear decrease (i.e., more negativity) for valence and the opposite trend for arousal
were observed, showing that the perceived emotionality of the IAPS pictures was
altered according to the modulation strategy. In the Testing phase (B), rejection rates
(RR) interacted with strategy, with increased rejections in the Up condition for unfair
offers, and increased acceptances in the Down condition for the same set of offers.
Collapsing across unfair offers (from V1 to V4) (C) demonstrated a linear trend in the
rejection pattern.
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and Down conditions (as a measure of reappraisal success),
showing that participants good at reappraising emotional
pictures were also good at reappraising decisions.
Imaging Results
To begin with, an initial set of contrasts was examined to
explore the effects of reappraisal strategy (‘‘Effect of strategy’’).
This included the main effect of strategy, independent of offer
amount and decision, as well as additional analyses to examine
the effect of each of the 3 strategies (Up, Down, and Look) on
each offer type (fair accepted, unfair accepted, and unfair
rejected—as expected, virtually no fair offers were rejected).
This resulted in 9 separate contrasts (fair accepted during
downregulation, fair accepted during look, fair accepted during
upregulation, unfair accepted during downregulation, unfair
accepted during look, unfair accepted during upregulation,
unfair rejected during downregulation, unfair rejected during
look, unfair rejected during upregulation).
Next, we computed 2 sets of contrasts to identify regions
associated with regulated versus unregulated decisions
(‘‘Effects of regulated vs. unregulated decisions’’). The ﬁrst
contrast looked at a greater number of accepted offers during
downregulation and a greater number of rejected offers during
upregulation. The second answered a similar question, but
looked at unfair accepted > unfair rejected during down-
regulation, and unfair accepted < unfair rejected during
upregulation.
Finally, to identify regions that were modulated according to
the strategies employed, we computed the contrast down <
look < up (e.g., isomorphic with the behavioral pattern as
shown in Fig. 2C), for each of the 3 sets of trial types, resulting
in 3 contrasts (down < look < up for fair accepted, down <
look < up for unfair accepted, down < look < up for unfair
rejected) (‘‘Effects of regulation’’).
Effects of Strategy
Regions involved in the implementation of reappraisal strate-
gies (collapsing across offer type) are shown in Table 1A and
Figure 3. Active brain regions, in order of signiﬁcance, were
bilateral precuneus, the left inferior, middle, and superior
frontal gyrus (SFG) (collectively DLPFC), and bilateral anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). Overall these regions responded more
strongly to both the ‘‘Down’’ and ‘‘Up’’ conditions as compared
with the ‘‘Look’’ condition. In addition to the general effects
outlined above, we were also interested in how the different
strategies (up vs. down) were implemented for the different
offer types. In these analyses, we looked at responsiveness to
strategy separately for unfair rejected (see Table 1B), unfair
accepted and fair accepted offers.
For the unfair rejected offers, the analyses produced similar
activations to the main effect of strategy, with signiﬁcant
activation of the right DLPFC (middle/inferior frontal gyrus [M/
IFG], Brodmann area [BA] 9), Anterior Cingulate (BA 32), and
SFG (BA 6). The same contrast for unfair accepted and fair
accepted offers did not return any signiﬁcant activation. We
focused on the activity of IFG, a region previously associated
with reappraisal (Ochsner et al. 2002; Ochsner and Gross 2005)
(see Fig. 3). Activation time courses were extracted using
Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al. 2002) from a 6 mm sphere
centered around the peak of activity. Stronger responses were
evident for unfair rejected offers for the 2 regulation strategies
as compared with the baseline look condition. Moreover,
stronger activity was observed for the Up as compared with the
Down strategy. In contrast, the unfair accepted and the fair
accepted offers were, as expected, not modulated by the
strategy in line with the primary contrasts for the same
conditions.
To determine whether activation in IFG during UG
regulation might be related to individuals’ self-reported use of
emotion regulation, we correlated individuals’ IFG mean
activity with their ERQ (reappraisal subscale) scores (Gross
and John 2003). This demonstrated a signiﬁcant positive
correlation (q = 0.653, P < 0.001), indicating that the reported
frequency of reappraisal usage in daily life (i.e., a higher score
in the ERQ-reappraisal subscale) was associated with stronger
IFG activity during emotion regulation on UG trials. This
conﬁrms and extends a role for the DLPFC in reappraisal
(Drabant et al. 2009) (see Fig. 4A, right).
Effects of Regulated Decisions
In addition to the general effect of applying a reappraisal
strategy, we were also interested in looking at neural activation
when participants regulated their decision (for each of the 2
strategies) as compared with when they did not. We deﬁned
downregulated decisions as an increased number of unfair offer
acceptances. Regions responding to downregulation, calcu-
lated as greater activity for unfair accepted offers in the ‘‘Down’’
as compared with ‘‘Look’’ condition, were the left middle
frontal gyrus (MFG), as well as the left superior temporoparietal
regions, bilateral SFG, and the anterior cingulate. Of these
regions, the SFG also correlated with acceptance rates of
subjects (q = 0.399, P < 0.05; see Table 2A and Fig. 4A).
Conversely, regions associated with upregulated decisions, that
is, greater activity for unfair rejected offers in the ‘‘Up’’
compared with ‘‘Look’’ condition, were the left IFG as well as
the insula bilaterally, and the right MFG and left SFG, and
a swathe of temporoparietal regions. Of these regions, the right
MFG correlated with rejections rates of the subjects (q = 0.416,
P < 0.05; see Table 2B and Fig. 4B). The question of which brain
regions are responsible for regulated decisions can also be
answered by computing the contrast ‘‘unfair accepted > unfair
rejected for downregulation,’’ and ‘‘unfair accepted < unfair
rejected for upregulation.’’ These contrasts, interestingly,
conﬁrmed the results found by the previous contrasts (SFG/
Table 1
Effects of strategy; (A) main effect of strategy (Down þ Up [ Look) and (B) effect of strategy
for unfair rejected (Down þ Up [ Look)
Anatomical
label
(BA)
Voxel H Z P MNI
(x, y, z)
(A)
Precuneus (7) 291 L 4.72 \0.001 3, 55, 64
IFG (44) 71 L 4.60 \0.001 51, 5, 13
AC (24) 62 L 4.54 \0.001 3, 29, 7
MFG (9) 40 L 4.46 \0.001 30, 35, 34
SFG (10)* 126 R 3.94 \0.001 15, 5, 70
MFG (6)* 21 R 3.47 \0.001 45, 2, 46
(B)
IFG-MFG (9) 93 R 4.89 \0.001 39, 11, 22
AC (32) 48 L 4.53 \0.001 9, 32, 13
SFG (6)* 17 L 3.16 0.001 27, 32, 58
Note: Clusters of more than 10 contiguous voxels, whose global maxima at the cluster level meet
a P \ 0.05 FWE, (noted with *) or P \ 0.001 uncorrected are reported. H, hemisphere; IPL,
intraparietal lobule; CG, cingulate gyrus; OC, occipital cortex; MeFG, medial frontal gyrus.
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MFG for downregulation and IFG/MFG, insula, and tempor-
oparietal regions for upregulation).
Effects of Regulation
Finally, we were interested in examining brain regions modu-
lated by the reappraisal strategies. Active regions modulated by
reappraisal, that is, mimicking the behavioral effect (Down <
Look < Up), were found only for unfair rejected offers and
consisted of the posterior and anterior left insula, the posterior
cingulate cortex, the medial frontal gyrus, bilateral fusiform
gyrus, and the inferior parietal lobe (see Table 3). The same
contrast applied to both unfair accepted and fair accepted offers
respectively did not return any signiﬁcant voxels. To further
characterize the activity of the anterior and posterior insula,
a region shown previously to be involved in UG decisions,
activation time courses extracted from the voxels were
computed. Up and Down modulation was evident in the
posterior insula, showing greater activation for Up as compared
with Look and greater for Look as compared with Down.
Anterior insula showed a modulation only for Up (see Fig. 5).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the extent to
which decision making in a socially interactive context could
be modulated by using emotion regulation strategies, speciﬁ-
cally reappraisal. Although it seems evident that emotional
factors play a role in these decision situations, it is still largely
unknown how these processes operate. In particular, we were
interested in the neural mechanisms by which emotion
regulation strategies changed participants’ responses to unfair
UG offers. We found that decisions were altered according to
the speciﬁc strategy used and additionally that these decisions
were associated with speciﬁc patterns of neural activity.
The Reappraising Brain and Mentalizing
The speciﬁc reframing strategies utilized here affected several
brain regions. Use of both up- and downregulation strategies
recruited the DLPFC, including the inferior, middle, and SFG, as
well as the ACC, and temporoparietal areas. Activity in these
regions is in accordance with previous ﬁndings on regulating
emotions induced by simple visual stimuli (Ochsner et al. 2004;
Goldin et al. 2008), thus extending the role of these areas into
the regulation of more complex socioeconomic emotions.
Overall, the regions involved in both regulation strategies
can be grouped into several functional clusters. The DLPFC has
been implicated in active cognitive control and inhibition
(Knight et al. 1999; Smith and Jonides 1999; Miller and
Cohen 2001), and may underlie the generation and
Figure 3. The main effect of strategy returned significant activations for left IFG, MFG, right SFG, and bilateral anterior cingulate (AC). Overall these regions responded more to
Up and Down conditions as compared to Look, independent of offers and the decision (accept/reject). Of these regions the IFG BOLD activity showed selective activations for Up
and Down compared with Look only for unfair rejected offers. Moreover, IFG correlated with the Emotion Regulation questionnaire measure, suggesting a role for this region when
regulating emotions more generally.
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maintenance of reappraisal strategies (Ochsner et al. 2002,
2004). The ACC has been shown to play an important role in
the online monitoring of performance and evaluating the need
Figure 4. Brain regions involved in regulated decisions. Downregulated decisions (A) were calculated as the regions more active for unfair accepted offers, and returned
predominantly the left superior and MFG. Upregulated decisions (B) were calculated as the regions more active for unfair rejected offers, and returned primarily the left IFG.
Table 2
Effects of regulated decisions; (A) down reappraisal (unfair accepted Down [ Look) and (B) up
reappraisal (unfair rejected Up [ Look)
Anatomical
label
(BA)
Voxel H Z P MNI
(x, y, z)
(A)
PL (2) 642 L 4.79 \0.001 36, 19, 70
MFG (10) 121 L 4.63 \0.001 36, 41, 7
ACC (32) 46 L 4.11 \0.001 18, 32, 22
Precuneus (7) 307 L 4.08 \0.001 6, 55, 64
SFG (6) 58 L/R 3.78 \0.001 6, 8, 67
(B)
IFG (9) 779 L 5.15 \0.001 48, 2, 19
Insula (13)^ 31 L 4.92 \0.001 45, 5, 10
MFG (10) 1647 R 4.87 \0.001 45, 1, 40
Insula (13)^ 31 R 4.45 \0.001 36, 17, 4
SFG (9) 49 L 4.53 \0.001 30, 35, 34
PL (7) 97 L 4.42 \0.001 27, 61, 55
SFG (9) 59 R 4.19 \0.001 24, 44, 28
OC (18) 200 R 4.07 \0.001 15, 70, 5
IPL (40)* 38 L 4.03 \0.001 54, 37, 49
Note: Clusters of more than 20 contiguous voxels whose global maxima at the cluster level meet
a P \ 0.05 FWE, or P \ 0.001 uncorrected (as noted with *), are reported. ^ indicates regions
included in the main clusters, separated with small volume corrections. H, hemisphere; a.Insula,
anterior insula; p.Insula, posterior insula; PL, parietal lobe; IPL, intraparietal lobule; OC, occipital
cortex; MeFG, medial frontal gyrus.
Table 3
Effects of regulation (unfair rejected offers for Down \Look \ Up)
Anatomical
label
(BA)
Voxel H Z P MNI
(x, y, z)
IPL (40) 204 R 6.86 \0.001 33, 37, 40
FG (18) 597 L 6.55 \0.001 27, 88, 7
FG (18) 516 R 6.42 \0.001 33, 88, 14
p.Insula (13) 22 L 6.28 \0.001 45, 22, 25
IFG (9) 43 R 6.14 \0.001 39, 1, 34
MeFG 366 L 5.98 \0.001 24, 4, 43
CG (6) 138 R 5.97 \0.001 3, 7, 58
Insula 28 R 5.87 \0.001 27, 20, 7
MeFG 26 L 5.68 \0.001 51, 2, 7
Precuneus 26 L 5.64 \0.001 21, 70, 40
a.Insula 7 L 5.49 \0.001 36, 11, 4
Note: Clusters of more than 6 contiguous voxels whose global maxima at the cluster level meet
a P \ 0.05 FWE, are reported. ^ indicates regions included in the main clusters, separated
with small volume corrections. H, hemisphere; a.Insula, anterior insula; p.Insula, posterior
insula; IPL, intraparietal lobule; CG, cingulate gyrus; OC, occipital cortex; MeFG, medial frontal
gyrus.
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for cognitive control in case of conﬂicting responses or
motives (Botvinick et al. 2001; Ochsner et al. 2004; Yeung
and Sanfey 2004). Importantly, the ventral part of the
prefrontal cortex is well connected with brain structures such
as the insula, which have been implicated in the affective
response to unfair offers (Sanfey et al. 2003). One hypothesis
derived from these activations is that the prefrontal cortex
actively modulates insular activity via reappraisal in order to
produce a decision more consistent with the regulation
context.
The medial prefrontal cortex, including the paracingulate
cortex and also temporoparietal areas, have been implicated in
mentalizing and intention detection (Frith U and Frith CD
2003), and may be particularly important here, as reappraisal
strategies speciﬁcally led participants to reinterpret the
intentions of their opponents, as assessed by self-report
measurements taken after scanning. Making sense of social
interactions requires inferring intentions, beliefs, and desires
(i.e., mentalizing; see Frith et al. 1991), and this appears to be
what players were doing when applying the reappraisal
strategies during the UG. This is in concurrence with a recent
study that demonstrated mentalizing abilities at work when
making value-based decisions (Evans et al. 2011).
Interestingly, this activation pattern has been previously
reported both when reappraising emotional pictures (Ochsner
et al. 2004) and obtaining rewards in monetary games
(Staudinger et al. 2009; Martin and Delgado 2011). One
interpretation might therefore be that DLPFC is involved in
modulating both behavioral and emotional outputs in order to
satisfy contextual demands (Mitchell 2011).
Decision Making Can Be Inﬂuenced in Different
Directions
Our data demonstrate that reappraising the context of
socioeconomic exchanges strongly affected players’ behavior,
as well as the associated neural activity. Participants were
trained in the use of up- and downregulation strategies, which
provide a means to inﬂuence emotional reactivity by manipu-
lating the cognitive interpretation of a stimulus and conse-
quently changing the emotional response (Gross 2002).
Previous studies (Gross and John 2003; Sokol-Hessner et al.
2009; Staudinger et al. 2009; Jarcho et al. 2011; Martin and
Delgado 2011) have shown that this strategy modulates
emotional reactivity. Here, we demonstrated that rejection
rates in the UG were affected by the strategy adopted:
participants accepted signiﬁcantly more unfair offers when
downregulating and rejected signiﬁcantly more unfair offers
when upregulating, as compared with a control condition in
which regulation was not used. Notably, these effects were
within subject, that is, individuals altered their decisions, and
therefore presumably their sensitivity to fairness concerns,
depending on the context. This is important, as typically
participants in the UG exhibit quite consistent patterns, and
therefore a demonstration of regulation effects within subject
makes a strong case for the power of the reappraisal effect.
Recent experiments have demonstrated changes in decision
making following both incidental emotional induction (Harle`
and Sanfey 2007; Moretti and di Pellegrino 2010; Bonini et al.
2011), and neurophysiological manipulation via Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation (van’t Wout et al. 2010; Knoch et al.
2006), but this study extends these ﬁndings in important ways
by demonstrating that emotions directly related to the offer
itself can be controlled through top-down effort, leading to
changes in decisions and associated outcomes.
The present study also extends previous results (van’t Wout
et al. 2010), in which participants were instructed to use the
down-regulation strategies of both reappraisal and suppression.
This study found effects of downreappraisal only, but utilized
a between-subjects design and did not address potential neural
mediators of this process, nor the effect of upregulation. Here,
we use both up- and down-reappraisal strategies and a within-
Figure 5. Regions modulated by reappraisal in line with the behavioral pattern (i.e., down \ look \ up, Fig. 2C), returned regions showing a linear increase only for unfair
rejected offers. Anterior and posterior subregions of the left insula showed differential patterns, with the posterior part being more affected by the strategy. For display purposes,
the brain reported in this figure has been thresholded at P \ 0.001 uncorrected (instead of P \ 0.05 FWE as reported in the tables).
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subjects design, and additionally provide neural evidence of
successful regulation in decision making. Moreover, the
present study extends previous results on emotional regulation
more generally by demonstrating that reappraisal can signiﬁ-
cantly modify interpersonal socially driven emotions, as
opposed to simple negative emotional responses to unpleasant
pictures (Ochsner et al. 2004), or emotions associated with
individual decision making (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009; Stau-
dinger et al. 2009; Martin and Delgado 2011).
Regulation and the Insula
Of particular interest in the context of the UG was the activity
observed within the insula, an area previously shown to be
involved in responses to offers (Sanfey et al. 2003), in particular
to rejections of unfair offers. Consistent with previous studies
(Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002; Camerer
2003; Xiao and Houser 2005), postscanning debrieﬁng demon-
strated that anger was the primary emotion elicited by the
unfair proposals. Interestingly, neural evidence of the in-
volvement of the insula in the emotion of anger has been
recently shown (Denson et al. 2009). This area showed
functional speciﬁcity in the present study—activity in more
anterior areas was affected by upregulation but not by
downregulation, with a more posterior region strongly
affected by both regulation strategies, and in which activity
tracked closely with the behavioral ﬁndings. The 2 subregions
of the insula active in our study (anterior and posterior)
overlap with recent functional--cytoarchitectural subdivisions
suggested by animal and human studies (Wager and Barret
2004). According to this classiﬁcation, the anterior agranular
insula processes drive and emotional states such as body
feelings and motivations (Freeman and Watts 1950). In
contrast, the more posterior subregion of the insula may be
more strongly connected to somatic and visceral inputs and
outputs, assisting the interpretation and modulation of the
autonomic signals ascending from the body. This model
overlaps with one proposed by Craig (2009), which posits
that the anterior insula processes social motivational and
cognitive conditions as well as hedonic evaluations, whereas
the posterior part processes visceral interoceptive represen-
tations. Therefore, this suggests that the posterior part of the
insula, via its known connections to the perception of
autonomic and visceral states, is a mechanism by which the
reappraisal strategies could affect the emotional perception of
the offers.
Interestingly, several other regions were affected by regula-
tion in a down < look < up fashion. For example, visual cortices
and fusiform areas showed a modulation, likely due to their role
in perceiving the face of the proposer. This suggests that
participants may have already started their interpretation of the
proposers’ behavior at the time the identity of the player is
uncovered. Another region modulated was a section of parietal
cortex. One possible explanation for this activation is that
participants may have altered their perception of the monetary
offers according to the strategy (e.g., interpreting a low offer as
even lower because of an upregulation strategy). Finally, the
posterior-medial cingulate cortex was also modulated. This
region has been previously associated with negative emotions,
especially anger (Murphy et al. 2003), which is the speciﬁc
emotion that appeared to be involved here when regulating.
Though these are certainly speculative interpretations, future
studies could usefully test these hypotheses and build a broader
picture of brain regions modulated by reappraisal.
Implications for the Role of Dorsolateral Prefrontal
Cortex in Decision Making
Our data demonstrate multiple roles for the dorsal and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in emotional regulation and
decision making. First, this region (mainly BA 44, 46, and 9),
together with other areas, was involved in the implementation of
the 2 reappraisal strategies. Second, activity in this region
correlated with ratings on the ERQ (Gross and John 2003),
implicating DLPFC in the frequency with which we apply
regulation strategies. There are well-established individual
differences in terms of the ability to regulate emotions (Gross
and John 2003; Drabant et al. 2009), and DLPFC functionality
may be responsible for this variability. This is consistent with
a proposed model regarding the role of prefrontal cortex in
modulating emotions (Ochsner and Gross 2005; Drabant et al.
2009). Third, we provided evidence that DLPFC activity
correlates with acceptance and rejection rates in the successful
‘‘Down’’ (more lateral) and ‘‘Up’’ (more ventral) regulation
conditions, showing a further segregation of this region in line
with recent results (Wager et al. 2009). This region may play
a key role in modulating the impact of emotional stimuli
providing a ﬂexible contribution to modulate our decisions. The
involvement of this region in both decision making and
regulation is interesting, and may reﬂect the fact that both of
these processes are inﬂuenced by emotion (Mitchell et al. 2011).
Although previous studies have implicated DLPFC in the UG
behavior (e.g., Sanfey et al. 2003), asking participants here to
reappraise the proposer’s offer (and behavior) ampliﬁed the
process of evaluation. The fact that DLPFC increases in activity
when implementing strategies further clariﬁes the role of this
region in decision making, which may well be to process the
multiple motives, from personal norms to objective evaluations to
emotional reactions, necessary to produce a context appropriate
decision. An important reason why we should consider decision
making and emotion regulation together is that coexisting
abnormalities in these processes are associated with aberrant
social behavior in many psychiatric disorders (Mitchell 2011).
In conclusion, we provide evidence here, both behaviorally
and neurally, that the typical decision pattern that accompanies
an unfair Ultimatum offer can be changed following reappraisal
of the proposer behavior, and suggest neural mechanisms by
which this process may occur.
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